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Abstract
We deﬁne a security notion for non-interactive key distribution protocols. We identify an apparently hard computational problem
related to pairings, the Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman problem (BDH). After extending Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara’s pairing based
protocol to a slightly more general setting, we show that breaking the system is polynomially equivalent to solving BDH in the
random oracle model and thus establish a security proof.
© 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
A non-interactive key distribution protocol is a way to create a shared secret between two parties, henceforth called
“Alice” and “Bob” as usual to avoid confusion. While interactive protocols like the classical Difﬁe–Hellman key
exchange require some communication between Alice and Bob to establish the common secret, this is not the case for
non-interactive systems, hence the name.
Without further communication, the only informationAlice and Bob have on each other are their respective identities,
so that non-interactive cryptography is necessarily identity-based, a concept introduced by Shamir in [22]. In such a
system,Alice derives the shared secret from her private key and Bob’s identity, which can be seen as his public key, and
Bob does likewise. Public keys being ﬁxed by the participants’ identities,Alice is clearly unable to determine her private
key by herself; otherwise, Bob would be able to deduce Alice’s private key as well, since he possesses the very same
information on Alice’s identity as herself. Thus, the help of a trusted third party is needed, the private key generator
(PKG), who possesses additional privileged information in the form of a master-key. The role of the PKG is precisely to
derive private keys from public identities using the master-key and to issue these private keys to their legitimate holders.
Hence, another way of seeing the information ﬂow in a non-interactive system is that the synchronous communication
between Alice and Bob is replaced by asynchronous communication with the PKG.
In [22], Shamir proposes only an identity-based signature scheme, leaving open among others the problem of
key distribution. Maurer and Yacobi [16] suggest the ﬁrst non-interactive key distribution scheme, based on discrete
logarithms in (Z/nZ)× with composite n. However, some version of the protocol is soon shown to be insecure [14].
Even with the improvements of [17] it can be broken by two colluding participants, who with a high probability
can retrieve the PKG’s secret information, that is the factorisation of n [13]. In the unbroken version, the modulus
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m is chosen as the product of two primes p such that the maximal prime factor q of p − 1 is of medium size. To
determine a private key, the PKG computes discrete logarithms modulo the prime factors of p − 1, which by Pollard’s
 algorithm can be done with a complexity in O(√q). An attacker may also proﬁt from the special structure of the
primes and factor n by Pollard’s p − 1-method in time essentially O(q). The relatively small difference between the
complexities for creating a key and for breaking the system induces an impractically high computational load on the
PKG (cf. [14]).
An alternative protocol, suggested by Hühnlein et al. [10], uses non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. The PKG
has to solve discrete logarithm problems in the class group of an imaginary quadratic ﬁeld and in a ﬁnite ﬁeld, and the
fastest algorithm for the class group step known to date has a subexponential complexity with exponent 12 . A potential
attacker is assumed to have to factor the discriminant, which can also be done in subexponential time with exponent 12
by the elliptic curve method. Hence, this scheme also requires that the PKG dispose of an enormous computing power,
and the margin between instances not manageable by the PKG and instances vulnerable by attacks is very small.
Furthermore, it is uncertain how well a choice of parameters falling into today’s small margin of security will resist
the exponential growth of computing power predicted by Moore’s law.
In his diploma thesis [12], Kügler develops a key distribution system based on the discrete logarithm problem in
(Z/nZ)× for composite n, in which the PKG can compute private keys in polynomial time.
None of the above protocols come with a formal proof of security.
The Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves have originally been introduced into cryptology to break certain
elliptic curve cryptosystems [18,8]. Recently, it was shown in [11,21] that these pairings also present a constructive
facet, namely that they can be used for establishing a tripartite Difﬁe–Hellman or a non-interactive key agreement
protocol. Again, the protocols come without a formal security proof. Numerous applications have since then emerged,
ranging from identity-based encryption [2] over interactive key agreement protocols [23] and short [3] or identity-based
signatures [21,6,9,20] to signcryption protocols [4,15].
In this article, we extend the non-interactive identity-based key distribution protocol of [21] to the setting of a
very general pairing, whose properties are reviewed in Section 2. The protocol itself is described in Section 3. This
generalisation is needed, for instance, to implement the protocol using the Weil pairing on ordinary elliptic curves, and
it sheds new light on the precise prerequisites for setting up such a pairing based system.We identify an apparently hard
problem, the bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman problem (BDH) (which is in fact a slight generalisation of the BDH introduced in
[2]). We proceed by deﬁning a notion of security in Section 4, and we prove that in the random oracle model, breaking
the protocol is polynomially equivalent to solving the BDH problem, see Section 5. In particular, assuming that the
BDH problem is hard, the protocol is secure. Concrete implementations are obtained, for instance, from the Tate or
Weil pairings on algebraic curves. In this setting, the PKG can compute private keys in polynomial time by a scalar
multiplication on the curve. The effort for an adversary to solve the BDH problem, however, even when using the fastest
algorithm known to date, is at least subexponential.
2. Pairings and the BDH problem
In the remaining sections, we let (G,+), (Gˆ,+) and (V ,×) denote groups of prime order . The sets of their non-
neutral elements are denoted by G∗, Gˆ∗ and V ∗, respectively. We suppose that e : G × Gˆ → V is a pairing satisfying
the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(aP , bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P ∈ G, Q ∈ Gˆ, a, b ∈ Z.
• Non-degeneracy: there exist P ∈ G and Q ∈ Gˆ such that e(P,Q) = 1. In our setting of prime order groups this
is equivalent to e(P,Q) = 1 for all P ∈ G∗, Q ∈ Gˆ∗.
• Computability: given P ∈ G and Q ∈ Gˆ, the value e(P,Q) can be efﬁciently computed.
For instance, the Tate and Weil pairings on elliptic curves have these properties. If E is an elliptic curve deﬁned over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq and  is some prime number (for efﬁciency reasons taken to divide the cardinality of E), then the Tate
and Weil pairings can be deﬁned as pairings from the -torsion points E[] into some ﬁeld extension F×
qk
. For k not too
large, they can be computed efﬁciently. Choosing supersingular curves as originally proposed, one always has k6,
but it is unknown whether the use of these curves with their special and very rich algebraic structure might lead to
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security problems. Moreover, the value of k = 6 is only achievable in characteristic 3, otherwise k is at most 4. And to
keep the discrete logarithm problems on the elliptic curve and in the ﬁnite ﬁeld equally hard, larger values of k will be
required in the near future. For instance, it is estimated that discrete logarithms in a ﬁnite ﬁeld of 2048 bits are about
as difﬁcult to compute as on an elliptic curve of 200 bits, which corresponds to a value of k = 10. This requires the
use of ordinary elliptic curves. In [21,19], it is shown how to obtain such curves for certain small values of k. Recently,
constructions for ordinary curves with arbitrary values of k have been given [7,1,5].
As E[] is of order 2, and more precisely of type Z/Z × Z/Z, one has to choose subgroups of order  for G
and Gˆ. With the Tate pairing, it is hereby often possible to take G = Gˆ, while the antisymmetry of the Weil pairing in
principle forces G and Gˆ to be distinct. For supersingular curves, one may sometimes deﬁne a modiﬁed Weil pairing
on a single subgroup of order , using so-called distortion maps introduced by Verheul in [24] (see also [2,3,9]). For
ordinary curves, this is not possible, so that our generalisation to distinct G and Gˆ becomes necessary.
It turns out that the security of the key exchange protocol to be deﬁned in Section 3 relies on the hardness of the
following problem, baptised the bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman problem (BDH): given (P,Q, aP , bQ, cP , cQ), compute
e(P,Q)abc. This is the same problem as the bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman problem introduced in [2], except that we allow
the groups G and Gˆ to be different. A probabilistic algorithmA is said to (t, )-solve BDH in (G, Gˆ, V , e) ifA runs
in time at most t and correctly solves the problem with probability at least , that is,
Prob(A(P,Q, aP , bQ, cP , cQ) = e(P,Q)abc).
The probability is taken over the uniformly and independently distributed P ∈ G∗, Q ∈ Gˆ∗ and a, b, c ∈ F× and over
the random choices ofA.
3. The non-interactive key distribution protocol
Formalising the protocol of [21] and extending it to the framework of general pairings introduced in the previous
section, the key sharing protocol can be naturally divided into four distinct algorithms: Setup, Master-key generation,
Private key distribution and Common secret computation.
• Setup: choose G, Gˆ, V and e as in Section 2, and let H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗ and Hˆ : {0, 1}∗ → Gˆ∗ be cryptographic
hash functions (in the case where G and Gˆ are torsion subgroups of an elliptic curve, these may be derived from
common cryptographic hash functions using techniques described, for instance, in [3]). All these parameters are
publicly known.
• Master-key generation: the PKG chooses a random master-key s ∈ {1, . . . ,  − 1}.
• Private key distribution: whenever a user A ﬁrst wishes to use the system, he contacts the PKG and asks for his
private key pair. Using A’s identity IDA, the PKG computes A’s private key pair
(SA, SˆA) = (sH(IDA), sHˆ (IDA))
and sends it to A.
• Common secret computation: suppose that users A and B wish to create a common secret key. A computes B’s
public key
(PB,QB) = (H(IDB), Hˆ (IDB))
and conversely B computes
(PA,QA) = (H(IDA), Hˆ (IDA)).
Then A can compute
(e(SA,QB), e(PB, SˆA))
and B can compute
(e(PA, SˆB), e(SB,QA)).
R. Dupont, A. Enge / Discrete Applied Mathematics 154 (2006) 270–276 273
The bilinearity of e makes it easy to see that the computed tuples are in fact equal and thus constitute a secret
shared between A and B.
4. Deﬁnition of security for non-interactive key distribution
In the non-interactive cryptographic setting of the previous section, the only observable trafﬁc is the distribution of
private keys. It is thus natural to consider the protocol secure if the corruption of an arbitrary number of private keys
does not reveal the shared secret between two further participants. In particular, a colluding group of participants who
reveal their private keys to one another then does not gain any insight into other people’s common secrets. Precisely, an
adversaryA is said to (t, )-break the protocol if it runs in time at most t and has advantage at least  in the following
game.
• Setup: the challenger publishes the general system parameters, namely (G, Gˆ, V , , e,H, Hˆ ).
• Extraction queries: A issues a number of extraction queries ID1, ID2, . . ., IDn to the challenger, who, upon
receiving the query IDi , computes the tuple (sH(IDi ), sHˆ (IDi )) and sends it back toA.
• Guess: OnceA decides that it has collected enough information, it picks two identities IDA and IDB , different
from all the IDi , and publishes a quadruple (IDA, IDB, , ).
The attackerA’s advantage is deﬁned as
Adv(A) = pA,1 + pA,2
with
pA,1 = Prob(e(H(IDA), Hˆ (IDB))s = )
and
pA,2 = Prob(e(H(IDB), Hˆ (IDA))s = ).
5. Security proof
In this section, we show that the BDH problem and the security of the non-interactive key distribution protocol of
Section 3 are polynomially equivalent. Specialised to the case G= Gˆ, our results yield a security proof for the original
key distribution protocol of [21].
Proposition 1. If the BDH problem in some setting (G, Gˆ, V , , e) can be (t, )-solved, then the key distribution
protocol in the setting (G, Gˆ, V , , e,H, Hˆ ) can be (t + , )-broken. Hereby,  is the time needed to carry out
one extraction query, to compute two hash values of H and of Hˆ and to carry out O(log ) group operations in G, Gˆ,
V and F× .
Proof. By issuing one key extraction query on an arbitrary identity and computing the hash values H and Hˆ of this
identity, an attacker on the protocol obtains two pairs (P, sP ) and (Q, sQ)withP ∈ G∗ andQ ∈ Gˆ∗.After multiplying
thesewith two uniformly and independently chosen integers from {1, . . . , −1}, wemay hereby assume thatP andQ are
uniformly and independently distributed over G∗ resp. Gˆ∗.Multiplying only the right hand sides with a random element
 ∈ {1, . . . ,  − 1} replaces them by cP and cQ with c = s uniformly distributed. The attacker then randomly selects
two identities IDA and IDB and two elements ,  ∈ {1, . . . ,  − 1} and computes R = H(IDA) and S = Hˆ (IDB).
Hereby, R = aP and S = bQ for some (unknown) a and b.
In theBDH instance (P,Q,R, S, cP , cQ), the randomvariablesP,Q,a,b and c are nowuniformly and independently
distributed. Solving the BDH problem provides the attacker with v = e(H(IDA), Hˆ (IDB))s . He then computes
r = ()−1 in F× and raises v to the power r, which yields the shared secret between A and B. 
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Theorem 2. Let the hash functions H and Hˆ be given by random oracles. Suppose that there is some adversaryAwho
(t, )-breaks the protocol with parameters (G, Gˆ, V , , e,H, Hˆ ). Assume furthermore that an upper bound qE on the
number of extraction queries issued byA is known.Then there is an algorithmB that (t ′, /(2 exp(1)2(1+qE)2))-solves
the BDH problem for (G, Gˆ, V , , e), where
t ′ = Kt(t1 + t2 + log qE) + t3,
K is a small constant and
t1 is the time needed to carry out a scalar multiplication in G or Gˆ or an exponentiation in V,
t2 is the time needed to generate a random bit,
log(qE) is the time needed to locate an entry in an ordered list with at most qE entries,
t3 is the time required to invert an element of F× .
Notice that in general, t ′ will be t times some polynomial in log , and log  t sinceA’s output is an element of V,
so that in fact t ′ is polynomial in t. The assumption that an upper bound qE on the number of extraction queries ofA
or, a fortiori, on its running time tqE be known byB, certainly shows limitations of the theorem. However, it seems
to be commonly adopted in the literature, cf. [2,3].
Proof. B has as input a random and uniformly distributed instance
(P,Q,Pa,Qb, Pc,Qc) = (P,Q, aP , bQ, cP , cQ)
of the BDH problem. For ﬁnding the solution e(P,Q)abc withA’s assistance, B has control over the hash functions
H and Hˆ . Basically, when queried for a hash value of, say, H, it outputs a random group element, obtained as a random
multiple of P or Pa . Thus B conforms to the random oracle model (to A, the hash function appears as a random
function) while at the same time keeping track of additional information (the discrete logarithms with respect to the
bases P or Pa). Of course, as a is unknown toB, it may control only one of the discrete logarithms. To be able to answer
to extraction queries,B should attach multiples of P to the corresponding identities; to retrieve the solution to the BDH
problem, it should attach a multiple of Pa to the identity for whichA ﬁnally emits its guess. These requirements putB
into a dilemma, becauseA may request hash values before deciding to query the private key or to emit a guess for the
corresponding identity. To solve the problem,B randomly goes for multiples of P or Pa and declares failure whenever
it realises that it has made the wrong choice previously. The probabilities of selecting P or Pa must depend on qE ,
since otherwise B’s success probability becomes exponentially small for qE tending to inﬁnity. The more extraction
queriesA makes, the more often B has to return a multiple of P. This is the reason why B needs to know at least an
upper bound on qE , and furthermore its success probability decreases the more private keysA extracts. In detail, B
implements the following routines:
H queries:B keeps an initially empty list L of tuples (X,R, h, u) ∈ {0, 1}∗×G×[1, −1]×{0, 1}, sorted according
to X. WhenA queries for the hash value of some bit string X,B checks if L contains a tuple (X,R, h, u). If this is not
the case, then B
• picks uniformly a random h ∈ [1,  − 1]
• picks u ∈ {0, 1} with Prob(u = 0) = , where  is a parameter to be determined later
• if u = 0, sets R = hP , otherwise sets R = hP a
• appends (X,R, h, u) to L
Finally, it sends R toA.
Hˆ queries: These are handled in the same way, B keeping a list Lˆ and returning a multiple of Q with probability 
and a multiple of Qb with probability 1 − .
Extraction queries: To answer to a query issued byA upon the string ID, the algorithm B:
• queries H and Hˆ as described above to make sure that L contains a tuple of the form (ID, R, h, u) and Lˆ a tuple
of the form (ID, S, hˆ, uˆ)
• checks if u = 1 or uˆ = 1, in which case it reports failure
• computes the tuple (hP c, hˆQc) and sends it toA
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Guess: Upon receiving the guess (IDA, IDB, , ) fromA, the algorithm B
• proceeds as in the case of H and Hˆ queries to make sure that L contains tuples of the form (IDi , Ri, hi, ui) and
Lˆ tuples of the form (IDi , Si, hˆi , uˆi ) for i = A,B
• uniformly picks a random t ∈ {0, 1}
• if t = 0, checks if uA = 1 and uˆB = 1 (otherwise reports failure), then outputs 1/(hAhˆB) as a guess
• if t = 1, checks if uB = 1 and uˆA = 1 (otherwise reports failure), then outputs 1/(hB hˆA) as a guess
Now, suppose thatB does not abort and let  be its output. With probability 12 , we have t = 0, whence uA = 1, uˆB = 1,
H(IDA)=hAPa=a hA P , Hˆ (IDB)=hˆBQb=b hˆB Q and =(hAhˆB)−1 , where the inverse is taken in F× . Independently,
with probability pA,1, we have = e(H(IDA), Hˆ (IDB))c. Thus, the following event happens with overall probability
pA,1/2:
 = (hAhˆB)−1 = e(H(IDA), Hˆ (IDB))c·(hAhˆB)−1
= e(ahAP, bhˆBQ)c·(hAhˆB)−1 = e(P,Q)abc,
where the last equality follows from the bilinearity of the pairing.
A similar analysis for t =1 shows thatB guesses correctly with an additional probability of pA,2/2. Since these two
events are disjoint, B’s guess is correct with a total probability of (pA,1 + pA,2)/2/2 whenever it does not abort.
We now compute the probability for B to abort. Let qE be the number of extraction queries issued by A. Then
the probability of non-abortion during each extraction query being 2 and the probability of non-abortion during the
guess phase being (1 − )2, the overall probability of non-abortion is at least (as qE has been taken to be an upper
bound on the actual number of extraction queries) 2qE (1 − )2. Minimising this function, we ﬁnd the optimal value
 = qE/(1 + qE) and an overall probability of non-abortion of at least 1/(exp(1)(1 + qE))2. Hence, the probability
that B outputs the correct solution to the BDH instance is at least /(2 exp(1)2(1 + qE)2).
The running time analysis of B is straightforward. 
Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 show that the BDH problem and the key distribution protocol are polynomially equiv-
alent, and describe accurately how the running times and success probabilities are transformed during the reductions.
Assuming that the BDH problem is hard, the security of the protocol is thus established.
It is possible to furthermore formalise the security notion from a complexity theoretic point of view. To do so, it is
necessary to introduce inﬁnite families of problem instances. Let thusF = ((Gk, Gˆk, Vk, k, ek))k∈N be a family of
BDH parameters as above. We say thatF satisﬁes the polynomial BDH assumption if, for any polynomials P and Q in
Z[X], there is no randomised algorithmA that (P (k), 1/Q(k))-solves the BDHproblem for (Gk, Gˆk, Vk, k, ek) for all
k ∈ N. The above proof shows that under the random oraclemodel, ifF satisﬁes the polynomial BDH assumption, then
the protocol with parameters fromF is secure in the sense that no polynomial time algorithm achieves a polynomial
advantage in breaking the protocol.
6. Conclusion
We have deﬁned a notion of security for non-interactive key distribution protocols. Slightly generalising the pairing
based protocol of [21], we have shown that the scheme satisﬁes this security property in the random oracle model if
the BDH assumption holds for the involved pairing. In particular, the protocol is secure against an arbitrary number of
colluding attackers.
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